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Re-engineering the UN  
Peacebuilding Architecture 
Rob Jenkins 
Preface  From the Project Director 
At the 2005 World Summit in New York City, member states of the 
United Nations agreed to create “a dedicated institutional mechanism 
to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict to-
wards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in 
laying the foundation for sustainable development”. That new mecha-
nism was the UN Peacebuilding Commission and two associated bod-
ies: a Peacebuilding Support Office and a Peacebuilding Fund. To-
gether, these new entities have been characterized as the UN’s new 
peacebuilding architecture, or PBA. 
 
This Working Paper is one of nine essays that examine the possible 
future role of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. They were written 
as part of a project co-organized by the Centre for International Policy 
Studies at the University of Ottawa and the Norwegian Institute of  
International Affairs. All of the contributors to the project were asked 
to identify realistic but ambitious “stretch targets” for the Peacebuild-
ing Commission and its associated bodies over the next five to ten 
years. The resulting Working Papers, including this one, seek to 
stimulate fresh thinking about the UN’s role in peacebuilding.  
 
The moment is ripe for such rethinking: During 2010, the UN will re-
view the performance of the PBA to date, including the question of 
whether it has achieved its mandated objectives. Most of the contribu-
tors to this project believe that the PBA should pursue a more ambi-
tious agenda over the next five years. While the PBC and its associ-
ated bodies have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves, that 
niche remains a small one. Yet the need for more focused international 
attention, expertise, and coordinated and sustained assistance towards 
war-torn countries is undiminished. It remains to be seen whether UN 
officials and the organization’s member states will rise to the chal-
lenge of delivering on the PBA’s initial promise over the next five 
years and beyond, but doing so will at least require a vision of what 
the PBA can potentially accomplish in this period. The Working  
Papers produced in this project are intended to provide grist for this  
visioning effort. 
 
Roland Paris 
Ottawa, January 2010 
Summary 
This paper argues that if the PBC and the PBSO are to avoid long-
term institutional decline, they will, over the next five to ten 
years, need to position themselves to play new roles – in terms of 
mandate, resources, procedures, and partnerships.  Four potential roles 
are discussed. First, the PBA could seek to lead an integrated ap-
proach to conflict prevention – not just lessening the risks of war re-
curring in countries ‘emerging from conflict,’ but also reducing the 
chances of an initial outbreak in countries facing an array of destabi-
lizing forces. Second, the PBA could occupy a more central niche in 
the stabilization and recovery planning process by managing an oth-
erwise-decentralized international civilian-response capacity. Third, 
the PBA could be tasked with ensuring that donors and aid-receiving 
post-conflict states live up to commitments found in country-specific 
peacebuilding ‘compacts,’ which must be arrived at through a more 
streamlined process. And, fourth, the PBA’s work plan could be tied 
to the process by which countries ‘graduate’ from the Security Coun-
cil’s agenda (as distinct from the PBC’s agenda, where such countries 
may remain for a longer period).  The paper identifies the pedigree of 
all four proposals, which have surfaced from time to time, and as-
sesses the chances that future circumstances might prove more condu-
cive to their enactment. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The three and a half years since the UN’s new ‘Peacebuilding Archi-
tecture’ (PBA) began operating in 2006 have been marked by consid-
erable reflection on how the three institutions of which it is composed 
can best contribute to the shared objective of sustainable peace. Soul-
searching over the most effective roles for the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion (PBC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peace-
building Fund (PBF) – individually and collectively – has taken place 
at internal ‘retreats,’ expert seminars, online ‘virtual’ discussions 
among practitioners, ‘induction’ events for new PBC member states, 
and a range of other forums – including, of course, formal meetings of 
the PBC itself.1 Annual reports on the PBC’s work have been issued. 
                                                 
1  For instance, Thomas J. Biersteker, ‘Prospects for the UN Peacebuilding Commission,’ 
Disarmament Forum (2007), pp. 37–44; and Report on the Stanley Foundation Confer-
ence, ‘Peacebuilding Following Conflict,’ New Paltz, New York, June 19-21 2009 (mi-
meo).  
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Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have debated the 
question of the PBA’s value-added.2 A number of formal and informal 
review documents – including more than one assessment of the PBF’s 
terms of reference – have also afforded a glimpse into the opportuni-
ties and constraints facing the PBA.3 
 
Because they have been conducted mainly through official (or quasi-
official) channels, these reflections have tended to work within a fairly 
restrictive set of reform parameters that are deemed to reflect political 
realities. In making arguments about the future of the PBA, this paper 
attempts to overcome the preoccupation with what is currently consid-
ered feasible. It does not assume that any and all options are equally 
viable. But neither does it accept as immutably given the set of con-
straints that presently passes for pragmatism. The paper also includes 
a brief conclusion that focuses on the nearer-term future, particularly 
the 2010 review of the PBC.  
 
With respect to the longer-term perspective – of roughly five to ten 
years – the paper argues that, over the next five to ten years, the UN 
system should seek to equip the PBA – in terms of mandate, re-
sources, procedures, and partnerships – to play four key roles. First, 
the PBA should deal comprehensively with conflict prevention – in-
cluding not just the recurrence of war in states ‘emerging from con-
flict,’ but also reducing the chances of an initial outbreak of violence 
in countries facing an array of destabilizing forces. Second, the PBA 
should occupy a key niche in the peace operation planning process by 
taking the lead role in establishing and managing an international civi-
lian-response capacity. Third, the PBA should be accorded greater au-
thority to ensure that both donors and aid-receiving states live up to 
commitments stated in country-specific peacebuilding ‘compacts,’ 
which must be arrived at through a more streamlined process. And, 
fourth, the PBA’s work plan should be directly tied to the process by 
which countries ‘graduate’ from the Security Council’s agenda (as 
distinct from the PBC’s agenda, where such countries may remain for 
a longer period). 
 
With respect to the paper’s secondary analytical objective – providing 
guidance in the context of the 2010 review of the PBA – the paper  
argues that various near-term objectives can be pursued to increase the 
likelihood that these new roles become possible  
 
The paper argues, further, that – especially in the near term – to max-
imize its leverage as an agent for comprehensive prevention, robust 
                                                 
2  UN Doc. S/PV.5627 (31 January 2007). 
3  For instance, Nicole Ball and Mariska van Beijnum, ‘Review of the Peacebuilding Fund’, 
June 4, 2009 (mimeo).  
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civilian-response capacity, rules-based aid relationships, and a stream-
lined Security Council agenda, the actors that collectively constitute 
the UN PBA must build on the existing interagency structures that en-
velope the UN system. Many of these – such as the Senior Peacebuild-
ing Group4 – are relatively new and untried. Others, such as the  
Executive Committee on Peace and Security, have been around 
longer, but not much. In other words, an older ‘peacebuilding archi-
tecture’ – constructed piecemeal over time, without the aid of a blue-
print – was in existence before the ‘new peacebuilding architecture’ 
arrived. Making the two work together will require substantial institu-
tional re-engineering over a prolonged period, extending beyond a 
decade. But in the near term, these organizational sinews represent a 
good opportunity for the PBA to initiate steps that could lead its com-
ponent institutions onto a new trajectory.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of 
the factors that must shape any assessment of the PBA’s future, in-
cluding the potential impact of existing organizational structures. Sec-
tions III-VI examine, respectively, the four proposed roles outlined 
above. The analysis focuses on how current practice among the insti-
tutional components of the PBA has informed these proposals and the 
benefits associated with each. Section VII concludes by outlining 
some of the reasons why the proposals contained within this paper 
may be more feasible in five to ten years than they seem today, and 
indicating steps that could be taken in the interim to assist the achie-
vement of mid-course organizational-reform benchmarks.  
 
 
 
II. Framing a New Approach 
Any assessment of what roles the PBC, PBSO, and PBF might use-
fully play five to ten years from now requires an awareness of three 
processes: (1) the gestation and birth of the PBA; (2) the PBA’s func-
tioning to date; and (3) the prevalence, frequency, and ongoing nature 
of organizational restructuring throughout the UN system.  
 
It is helpful to begin with the process through which the PBA came 
into being. Much that was originally planned for the PBA fell by the 
wayside as debates over its structure and functions dragged on, and 
consensus-seeking compromise took its toll. Earlier proposals for  
                                                 
4  The SPG is chaired by the ASG of Peacebuilding Support, and includes DPKO, DPA, 
DFS, DESA, DOCO, OCHA, UNDP, OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the World 
Bank, and the Secretary of the Policy Committee. It meets at ASG (or ‘comparable’) 
level. 
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something like the PBC provide insight into institutional gaps that, 
arguably, still require filling. For the purpose of this introductory dis-
cussion, four such proposals are outlined, each relating to a different 
dimension of the future PBA vision outlined in Sections III-VI.  
 
First, with respect to conflict prevention, it has been noted since the 
Brahimi Report5 was issued in 2000 – indeed all the way back to An 
Agenda for Peace,6 the document that in 1992 introduced the term 
peacebuilding into official discourse – that the UN needed a single, 
comprehensive approach to conflict prevention. Brahimi recom-
mended the creation of an early-warning information collection and 
analysis capacity within the UN, but was rebuffed.7 Similarly, in 2004, 
the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change advocated the creation of a standing mechanism through 
which global, regional, and country-specific security forecasts could 
be devised, assessed, and routinely acted upon.8 To the dismay of 
many observers and practitioners,9 the early-warning function was 
stripped out of the Secretary-General’s subsequent proposals for the 
PBA. The need for such a capacity has not lessened.  
 
Second, regarding the mobilization and maintenance of an integrated 
international civilian-response capacity, this issue too has a long pedi-
gree in discussions about what came to be the PBA. Analytical inputs 
to the High-Level Panel’s report emphasized the importance of creat-
ing a stand-by pool of expertise, organized into formed support teams, 
to restore the rule of law, begin delivering basic services, and provide 
effective security.10 After the Panel’s report was issued, consultations 
facilitated by the Governments of Denmark and Tanzania received 
briefings on how decision-making within such a system might be  
organized as well as estimates of the resources required.11 A combina-
tion of resistance by ‘Non-Aligned’ countries, the still-fresh diplo-
matic wounds following the US intervention in Iraq, and turf-
protecting machinations by various UN entities – Department of 
                                                 
5  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc A/55/305–S/2000/809 
(21 August 2000). 
6  United Nations, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping – Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992), 
paras. 55-59.  
7  The proposal was for this capacity was to be managed by the ECPS (Executive Commit-
tee on Peace and Security) Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat – or EISAS. 
8  United Nations (2004), A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New York, 2004. 
9  Among these were Richard Ponzio, The Creation and Functioning of the UN Peacebuild-
ing Commission (London: Saferworld, November 2005), pp. 4-5; and Lawrence Woocher, 
‘Peacebuilding and Prevention,’ World Federation of United Nations Associations-USA, 
26 June 2006, http://wfunauna.civiblog.org/blog/_archives/2006/6/26/2057643.html 
10  Shepard Forman, Building Civilian Capacity for Conflict Management and Sustainable 
Peace (‘Discussion Paper Prepared for the Government of Denmark’s Meeting on 
Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management’), June 2004, 
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/conflict/Forman-
%20Building%20Civilian%20Capacity.pdf  
11  For example at a discussion forum held on 17 January 2005. 
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Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Political Affairs 
(DPA), and UN Development Programme (UNDP) among them – 
triggered the demise of this idea.12  
 
Third, with respect to promoting and overseeing rules-based aid rela-
tionships in conflict and post-conflict settings (another potential role 
for the PBA), the PBC’s prehistory again provides clues to what might 
have been and still might be. Soon after the Brahimi Report was  
issued in 2000, proposals to create something like a PBC emerged. 
The Strategic Recovery Facility proposed in 2001 by Forman et al. 
was a very different organism than the PBA that ultimately came into 
being. But it had at its heart the objective of ensuring ‘the timely dis-
bursement of aid in a more coherent and equitable manner.’ The Facil-
ity was supposed to address ‘challenges that the international aid com-
munity must address to maximize its support for sustainable peace and 
reconstruction in the wake of conflict.’13 The Facility’s architects cal-
led for ‘stricter collaboration’ in several key activities, among which 
were designing aid interventions, harmonizing aid conditions, coordi-
nating assistance locally, and ensuring accountability in aid delivery 
and implementation. As we will see in the analysis of the PBA’s per-
formance to date, this remains a largely unmet need.  
 
Fourth, there are precedents for considering the PBA a potential in-
strument for assisting ‘exit’ – that is, a country’s ‘graduation’ off of 
the Security Council’s agenda. That the PBC’s continuing attention 
could help to ease the Council’s burden was one of the reasons why 
Fearon and Laitin suggested that a new peacebuilding institution be 
established. They recommended ‘a newly constructed arm of the UN 
to address some of the issues once handled by the now-defunct UN 
Trusteeship Council.’14 Discussions among member states and be-
tween them and UN officials, particularly in the months prior to the 
September 2005 World Summit in New York, included efforts by 
some highly placed UN officials to portray the PBC as something like 
a down payment on Security Council reform/expansion.15  
 
In addition to these four elements of the PBA’s genesis, devising a 
new approach to this still-young set of institutions requires a brief as-
sessment of the PBA’s experience thus far. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to engage in a comprehensive evaluation of the 
PBA’s work to date, this section reviews the operation of its compo-
                                                 
12  Memorandum Issued on Behalf of the ‘Non Aligned Movement’ (New York, April 2005). 
13  Shepard Forman, Stewart Patrick, and Dirk Salomons, ‘Recovering From Conflict: Strat-
egy For An International Response,’ Policy Paper Series (New York: Center on Interna-
tional Cooperation, 2001), p. 1. 
14  J Fearon and D. Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States’, International 
Security, 28:4 (Spring 2004), pp. 5-43, (p. 8). 
15  Author interview with a senior advisor in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 
13 February 2007. 
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nent institutions, efforts to redefine the scope of their mandates, and 
the PBA’s relations with other organizations (within and beyond the 
UN).  
 
Each of the three institutional components that comprise the PBC has 
a mixed record. The intergovernmental PBC has worked diligently to 
fulfill its mandate – taking seriously its stewardship role vis-à-vis the 
first four countries on its agenda: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Guinea Bis-
sau, and the Central African Republic. It has succeeded in focusing a 
considerable degree of international attention on these countries, 
though there is a limit to how much attention can be devoted to a par-
ticular set of post-conflict cases in a highly distractible world where 
new conflicts frequently erupt. Even ensuring predictable financing 
for these post-conflict states, another of the PBC’s responsibilities, is a 
tall order, given the relentless frequency with which donor roundtables 
and ‘flash appeals’ for fast-breaking humanitarian crises occur.  
 
The PBC has experimented with various means of fulfilling a core 
element of its mandate – ‘to advise on and propose integrated strate-
gies for post-conflict peacebuilding.’ This task has been undertaken 
largely in the context of countries on the PBC’s agenda. Several fac-
tors have constrained the PBC's ability to perform this task effectively. 
Among these are the PBC’s lack of operational authority (which de-
prives it of the carrots and sticks necessary to ensure coherence in  
donor approaches to supporting post-conflict recovery and state build-
ing); the considerable distance that the first two countries on its 
agenda (Burundi and Sierra Leone) had traveled down the post-
conflict timeline before the PBC became engaged; and the lack of 
clarity concerning the PBC’s ability to control PBF resources. The 
result has been a great deal of frustration among PBC members, post-
conflict countries on its agenda, and issue specialists and advocates 
who hoped that the PBC might help to ensure a consistent approach to 
peacebuilding.16  
 
For its part, the PBSO has over the past three years gradually im-
proved its capacity both to serve as the secretariat for the PBC and to 
engage in other activities consistent with its own reading of its man-
date, including knowledge dissemination, participation in mission 
planning, and the development of indicators and benchmarks on peace 
consolidation. The PBSO has consistently sought and obtained high-
level decisions – for instance, through the Secretary-General’s Policy 
                                                 
16  A range of issue-specific interests had sought from the time the PBA was coming into 
being, to influence its priorities. On gender, see UNIFEM and the NGO Working Group 
on Women, Peace and Security, The UN Peacebuilding Commission: A Blueprint for Am-
plifying Women’s Voices and Participation: A Discussion Paper, November 2005, 
www.peacewomen.org/un/ngo/.../Women_and_the%20PBC.pdf. On internally displaced 
persons, see William G. O’Neill, ‘IDPs and the Peacebuilding Commission’, consultation 
paper (New York: November 2006), mimeo.  
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Committee – confirming the PBSO’s remit in particular policy do-
mains. It is significant that the PBSO received its mandate in the form 
of a formal ‘decision’ of the Secretary-General nearly six months be-
fore the Security Council and General Assembly passed resolutions 
authorizing the PBA’s creation. 
 
The PBSO has worked assiduously to demonstrate its value-added, 
squeezing as much as possible from its mandate. The PBSO’s mission 
to consolidate knowledge and disseminate best practice on peacebuild-
ing has produced some useful reflection. The Peacebuilding Commu-
nity of Practice is a worthwhile innovation.17 Expecting it to make an 
immediate concrete impact on the effectiveness of programming is 
unrealistic, but as a networking forum it serves a useful function. 
Other knowledge-consolidation initiatives have proven less fruitful. 
The PBC’s Working Group on Lessons Learned – for which the 
PBSO should provide the intellectual and programmatic backbone – 
has been the subject of complaint, both for its level of organization 
and the sometimes dubious value of its deliberations. 
 
Attempts to improve the sharing of best practice – for instance, by de-
centralizing the process – have yielded mixed results. In August 2009, 
the PBSO helped to facilitate a ‘south-south’ learning process between 
Burundi (which has elections due in 2010) and Sierra Leone (which 
successfully completed its second post-conflict elections in late 2007). 
Sierra Leonean election officials and civil society representatives en-
gaged in a structured dialogue with their Burundian counterparts. Such 
events, while no doubt useful at the margins, frequently serve as an 
occasion for UN officials to highlight the invaluable role they are 
playing. In this instance, the Deputy SRSG took the opportunity to 
reiterate the value of the PBC’s support to Sierra Leone’s Election 
Commission and police force, and the PBC’s commitment to doing 
the same in Burundi.18  
 
The quality of the PBSO’s analytical work, with certain exceptions, 
proved disappointing. Documents produced for country-specific brief-
ings have often provided little serious, actionable, insight into con-
flict/recovery dynamics in the countries on the PBC’s agenda. Despite 
staffing constraints (brought on partly by the workload that came with 
overseeing the PBF) and limited leverage (due to the PBC’s lack of an 
operational mandate), a more focused PBSO could have generated 
analysis of direct use to PBC members, which despite the PBC’s insti-
                                                 
17  PBSO, ‘United Nations Peacebuilding: Practical Guidance Note,’ Discussion Paper for 
the UN Peacebuilding Community of Practice Workshop, 21-25 July 2008, Hiroshima, 
Japan.  
18  ‘Burundi Adopts Best Electoral Practices from Sierra Leone,’ Newstime Africa, 31 August 
2009, http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/1948  
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tutional shortcomings possess influence in their several other capaci-
ties.  
 
The PBF is less an independent entity, less a third pillar in the peace-
building architecture, than an instrument through which various  
actors, including but not limited to the PBSO and the PBC, seek to 
advance their ideas and interests. The PBF has funded a range of pro-
grammes across many thematic areas, including with respect to gender 
equality and environmental sustainability, two cross-cutting issues 
specifically identified in the General Assembly and Security Council 
Resolutions that established the PBA. There remain, however, many 
criticisms of the way in which the PBF has operated. These include 
concerns about slow implementation, severe understaffing at head-
quarters-level, variable quality of both priority-setting and project-
approval processes at country level, poor integration between PBF-
funded interventions and those supported by other forms of develop-
ment assistance, and a lack of meaningful performance measures for 
PBF projects.19 
 
Having gained some perspective on the PBA’s complex origins and 
how its component parts have worked, let us note briefly a third pro-
cess which may hold important implications for the PBA’s future, and 
which therefore requires consideration by those examining ways of 
making the PBA more relevant. This is the disruptive presence of 
lengthy, multiple, ongoing and pending programmes of institutional 
reform. Most such restructuring efforts are located within the UN, but 
others range beyond as well. An example of a non-UN process is the 
movement for ‘Aid Effectiveness’ and the international machinery 
that propels it from one summit and agreement (the Paris Declaration, 
2005) to another (the Accra Agenda for Action, 2008). This interna-
tional agenda has inserted itself into the institutional DNA of the new 
PBA – born within months of the Paris Declaration, and a child of its 
time – an emphasis on promoting ‘national ownership.’ Ownership, in 
this context, refers to the existence of genuine belief among officials 
in aid-recipient states in the efficacy of the policies they pursue. The 
ownership imperative is based on the conviction that if policy agendas 
are imposed from abroad – by the World Bank, the WTO, the Euro-
pean Union – then national actors will be less committed to imple-
menting them. This emphasis on home-grown policy solutions has 
been so dominant during the PBA’s early years that it has constrained 
actors working with and in the PBA from pursuing a more activist 
agenda-setting role. 
 
                                                 
19  See Nicole Ball and Mariska van Beijnum, ‘Review of the Peacebuilding Fund’ (New 
York, 4 June 2009).  
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In the context of the UN system, seemingly permanent organizational 
restructuring – at various levels, of varying severity, over a diverse 
range of time scales – casts a huge shadow over efforts to reinvent the 
PBA. This is partly, but not exclusively, due to the varied expectations 
to which these institutional reform efforts give rise. Among the reform 
initiatives that have affected the PBA to date is the gradual emergence 
of an agreed Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The devel-
opment of the IMPP was an arduous process, stretching over years. 
Much of the fine-grained detail is being worked out in the ‘implemen-
tation phase.’ However, over the past five years the only high-profile 
institutional reform that has involved the creation of a permanent in-
tergovernmental body, besides the establishment of the PBA, was the 
upgrading of the Human Rights Commission to create the Human 
Rights Council, another institution still finding its feet. Conflicts in 
one body have a way of expressing themselves in others. 
 
Another reform that affected the PBA’s early years was the adoption 
of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, which has slowly been 
taking root within the UN system and within international law. Some 
developing countries reacted sharply to the emergence of ‘R2P,’ 
which, like the PBC, was endorsed at the 2005 World Summit. Some 
fear that imperial adventures will result from the international com-
munity’s decision to take upon itself the duty of rescuing civilians and 
restoring security in cases where governments prove unable and/or 
unwilling to prevent or halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other high 
international crimes.20 Critics charge that R2P is a slippery slope to 
the passing of state sovereignty. The dismay at this prospect has at 
times generated extreme bitterness and has spilled over into other fo-
rums, including the PBC, where issues of sovereignty are never far 
from the surface.21  
 
Among the entities that undergo constant organizational restructuring 
are the constellations of interagency and interdepartmental standing 
committees, working parties, and task forces spread across the UN 
system. These typically assume relatively informal organizational 
forms, and therefore do little to bind the UN’s funds, agencies, and 
programmes to an agreed division of labour. As with bilateral aid pro-
grammes, specialized UN agencies respond vertically to their govern-
ing bodies and largest donors, not horizontally to (or collectively with) 
their counterparts working on similar issues in other UN entities. This 
substantial layer of interagency sinew complicates peacebuilding 
                                                 
20  See, for instance, Statement by Mr. Nirupam Sen, Permanent Representative, at the In-
formal Thematic Consultations of the General Assembly on The Report of the Secretary-
General entitled “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights 
for All” (A59/2005) (On Cluster III Issues: Freedom to Live in Dignity), on 20 April 2005 
(New York: Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, 2005).  
21  Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For 
All (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). 
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planning; but it also provides opportunities for PBA actors seeking 
additional points of leverage. These will be discussed in the context of 
each of the four elements of the future PBC vision outlined in the pa-
per’s next four sections.  
 
 
 
III. Coordinating Comprehensive  
Prevention 
The PBA can and should evolve into an institution that addresses all 
types, aspects, and stages of conflict-prevention. Currently, the PBA is 
mandated to engage only with states ‘emerging from conflict.’ It is 
confined, in effect, to one subsector of peacebuilding – post-conflict 
peacebuilding, which is conceptually distinct (but in many respects 
indistinguishable) from pre-conflict peacebuilding, which usually 
goes by the name of ‘prevention.’ Limiting the PBA to post-conflict 
states – for which the key issue is the recurrence of violence – under-
mines the ability of the UN system to develop an integrated and com-
prehensive approach to conflict-prevention, broadly conceived.  
 
There are two dimensions to this problem – one organizational, the 
other operational. First, assembling core expertise on the risks of and 
responses to fragile states – whether statistical (e.g., based on an ana-
lysis of conflict drivers) or qualitative (e.g., based on extensive coun-
try knowledge) – requires a systematic pooling of resources. This does 
not happen when ‘prevention of outbreak’ and ‘prevention of recur-
rence’ are placed into two separate categories, prompting unnecessary 
organizational fragmentation. Second, there is an operational advan-
tage to a unified system for (a) monitoring developments within and 
across at-risk countries; (b) sharing this information with key deci-
sion-makers in real-time; (c) charting the effects of decisions made; 
(d) tracking the uneven process through which countries engaged in 
peace negotiations fall into and out of armed conflict; and (e) provid-
ing high-quality analysis of security, economic, and humanitarian de-
velopments in states emerging from conflict.  
 
Under a ‘unified’ peacebuilding approach, staff working on a country 
at the post-conflict end of the prevention cycle would be operating on 
the basis of not only current information but also longitudinal data that 
has been consistently collected and analyzed over time. Because the 
data would reach back to the pre-conflict period, a comprehensive 
case file would be maintained for all states at risk. The type of infor-
mation the PBC and PBSO are currently able to process for the coun-
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tries with which they are engaged (which for the PBSO extends be-
yond the countries on the PBC’s agenda) provides only a snapshot. 
The prior context that would be provided through a comprehensive 
conflict-prevention threat-assessment system would offer something 
closer to graphic animation. The ability to trace back in time, through 
a chronologically arranged dossier, is a huge advantage for officials 
who must assess, for any given conflict situation, whether and how 
earlier clues had been misread and expectations mismanaged.  
 
The proposal, in short, is to bolster the PBA’s presence in the conflict-
prevention field by overcoming the largely artificial division between 
pre-conflict and post-conflict subsectors. Indeed, a more meaningful 
distinction is between different forms (rather than moments) of pre-
vention – namely, the structural, the systemic, and the operational. 
Structural prevention primarily concerns the use of aid instruments to 
bring about institutional reforms that it is hoped will address the un-
derlying sources of conflict – the so-called ‘root causes’. By contrast, 
an approach based on systemic prevention examines global scenarios 
to determine how to reduce the stresses vulnerable societies encounter 
as a result of transnational factors related to, inter alia, trade (licit and 
illicit), refugee flows, and climate change. Finally, operational preven-
tion refers to traditional methods of managing and defusing crises – 
through diplomatic outreach, targeted resources, and the exertion of 
great-power leverage. The PBA will have assumed a significant role 
in the UN system if it can improve coherence and consistency across 
these three levels of conflict prevention.22  
 
There is, admittedly, a certain perversity to examining the PBA as an 
instrument for generalized conflict prevention. Any kind of early-
warning role had been specifically rejected when the PBA’s institu-
tional design was debated among UN member-states and officials dur-
ing the first half of 2005. As noted, the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change wanted the PBC to have a more expansive 
prevention mandate, including an ‘early warning’ capability that 
would allow the UN to track ‘pre-conflicts’ and other threats to the 
peace far more systematically, including in ‘post-conflict’ countries 
where war was far enough in the past to warrant dropping the post-
conflict prefix. 
 
The PBC’s supporters had to sacrifice the early-warning capability in 
order to salvage the proposal to create the new Commission. There 
was genuine fear that the entire PBC concept could end up on the UN 
reformer’s equivalent of the cutting-room floor. To allay continuing 
concerns, the Secretary-General ultimately issued an addendum to his 
                                                 
22  Barnett R. Rubin and Bruce D. Jones, ‘Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Chal-
lenges for the United Nations,’ Global Governance 13 (2007), pp. 391-408. 
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March 2005 report on UN reform, In Larger Freedom, explicitly re-
voking any suggestion that the PBC would perform an early-warning 
function.23 This reflected the widespread view among G-77 members 
that the PBC represented another attempt by the leading Western po-
wers to enhance their capacity to intervene in the affairs of states they 
deemed misgoverned. It was in the climate created by these debates – 
which took place in the shadow of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq – that 
the proposed PBC was stripped of its early-warning function.  
 
Even though, currently, the PBA’s engagement is formally limited to 
the prevention-of-recurrence subsector of the prevention field, the 
PBSO is nevertheless routinely drawn into interagency structures that 
deal with the full range of prevention issues. In practice, the PBSO 
finds itself with an indirect voice in discussions about the initial out-
break of violence. Spaces created by interagency structures can foster 
the creative extension of organizational mandates.  
 
Part of the ambiguity that surrounds the role of the PBC in any UN-
wide comprehensive conflict-prevention system stems from the ques-
tion of when does a post-conflict country stop being a post-conflict 
country. There were some who felt that Sierra Leone was too far along 
the post-conflict road to constitute a good case for a new intergovern-
mental body dedicated to smoothing the path from peace implementa-
tion to development. Sierra Leone, in effect, was a ‘post post-conflict.’ 
A similar reaction accompanied the announcement that Guinea Bissau 
would be the third case on the PBC’s docket. It was initially felt that a 
case from outside Africa – e.g., East Timor – would be selected to 
provide ‘regional balance’ to the PBC’s portfolio. But more impor-
tantly, Guinea Bissau was an intriguing choice because it represented 
a different kind of post-conflict country – one whose brief period of 
open conflict had ended almost eight years earlier, in 2000. Political 
instability has clearly afflicted Guinea Bissau in the interim. Neverthe-
less, to classify Guinea Bissau as a state ‘emerging from conflict’ is 
fundamentally to redefine this category of cases.  
 
It might be argued that the Security Council’s continued interest in 
Guinea Bissau is sufficient grounds for locating this case in the post-
conflict category, and not somewhere further up the conflict-
prevention timeline. Regardless of official taxonomies, however, the 
profile of the Guinea Bissau case – which exhibits the classic symp-
toms of a fragile, pre-collapse state – ensures that the actions the PBC 
takes, and the strategies it recommends, will at least be heard within, 
if not exert direct influence over, the wider conflict-prevention field. 
Guinea Bissau possesses the chief characteristic of the archetypal pre-
                                                 
23  See ‘Addendum 2: Peacebuilding Commission – Explanatory note by the Secretary-
General’, http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/add2.htm  
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vention case: a state that is increasingly incapable of controlling flows 
of goods and people across its borders. For Guinea Bissau, narcotics 
trafficking is the key issue, a driver for the entrenchment of gangs and 
guns, both of which challenge the state’s supremacy.  
 
Not surprisingly, as a bureaucratic actor the PBSO has been more re-
ceptive than the PBC to embracing a more broadly conceived conflict-
prevention agenda. This is partly because the PBSO can exploit the 
opportunities afforded by participation in interagency structures. Sta-
tes, on the other hand, display great caution where issues of sover-
eignty are concerned. There is, in addition, a generalized concern that 
an excessive preoccupation with specialized ‘conflict prevention’ aid 
interventions may divert resources away from long-term development 
and toward piecemeal actions designed to in some instances prop up 
venal, non-performing governments, which can be both a cause and 
consequence of persistent instability.  
 
The PBSO’s ability to broaden its engagement in conflict prevention 
has taken place through two channels. The first is based on the 
PBSO’s mandate to draw on and consolidate knowledge from across 
the UN system. In this connection, the PBSO has been engaged in the 
UN Interdepartmental Framework for Coordination on Early Warning 
and Preventive Action. The ‘Framework Team’ is coordinated by the 
UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) but in-
cludes a wide range of UN actors. The Framework Team’s mission is 
to refine methods for anticipating the outbreak of violence, to assess 
the likely severity of nascent conflicts, and to suggest appropriate pro-
grammatic interventions. The Framework Team maintains an informal 
‘watch list’ of countries to be monitored. Because it monitors all 
countries where regime stability is threatened by systemic violence, 
not just states ‘emerging from conflict,’ the Framework Team pro-
vides the PBSO a ready-made entry point into conflict-prevention dis-
cussions.  
 
The PBSO has arguably been most successful in migrating further up 
the prevention timeline through its use of the Peacebuilding Fund. Be-
cause of the PBF’s reliance on voluntary contributions, its managers 
are relieved of at least some of the bureaucratic and financial shackles 
that constrain most Secretariat entities. The PBF also operates at some 
remove from the member-state politics that afflict the PBC itself. The 
mandate of the PBF, moreover, has been defined to permit PBF work 
in countries beyond those on the PBC’s agenda. Through this special 
‘window,’ the Secretary-General, acting ‘through the ASG for Peace-
building Support,’ is accorded wide latitude in using the fund to nip 
inchoate violence in the bud. This window may well be dominated in 
future by activities funded in fragile-but-not-yet-collapsed states. For 
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the PBF to continue to play this kind of pre-conflict prevention role, 
however, this division of labour between the PBSO and the PBC will 
likely need to be retained. Were the PBC to gain too much de facto 
control over the disbursement of PBF resources, contributions would 
likely decline. Remaining internally unintegrated holds certain advan-
tages for the PBA.  
 
 
 
IV. Establishing and Managing an  
International Civilian-Response  
Capacity 
As noted in Section II, even before the PBC was born, proposals ex-
isted for using a PBC-like entity to ensure the international commu-
nity’s ability rapidly to plan for and deploy, in a variety of configura-
tions, the civilian components of multi-dimensional peace operations. 
Indeed, Forman saw the PBC (and the PBSO) as a natural follow-on 
to efforts by governments, such as the UK and the US, to develop 
their own civilian-response capabilities, the shortcomings of which 
had become apparent soon after the US-led invasions of Afghanistan 
in 2001 and Iraq two years later. According to Forman, a dedicated 
intergovernmental body was needed because of the risk that, as new 
crises crowded their way onto the international agenda, many post-
conflict situations would ‘fall into the category of forgotten or neg-
lected crises,’24 for which it would prove increasingly difficult to se-
cure the requisite financing, expertise, diplomatic backing, and logis-
tical support.  
 
Since the PBA came into being, the need to empower its component 
parts to play such a role has been voiced from time to time. The idea 
of a ‘standby capacity’ at the international level was in fact part of the 
motivation for the UK’s decision, while it held the Security Council’s 
rotating chair in May 2008, to press for a focus on ‘early recovery’ 
activities in the ‘immediate aftermath of conflict.’ The Council, char-
acteristically, called for a report on the subject, which provided an oc-
casion to revisit some of the debates that attended the formation of the 
PBA.  
 
                                                 
24  Shepard Forman, ‘Working Better Together: Implementing the High Level Panel’s Re-
commendation on Peacebuilding’, Working Paper (New York: Center on International 
Cooperation, 2005).  
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The Secretary-General’s June 2009 ‘Early Recovery’ report went 
through several iterations, and among the points debated were the 
need for a surge capacity (and therefore a roster-based ‘standby’ sys-
tem); the difficulties of maintaining and operating such a mechanism; 
the skill gaps that persist in the absence of pre-deployment training 
geared specifically to peacebuilding and state-building; and a lack of 
adequate financing for these and related activities. Nevertheless, the 
process that produced the report revealed wide agreement on the need 
for the international community rapidly, coherently, and efficiently to 
provide: ‘basic safety and security’ (DDR, SSR, and the rule of law), 
‘political processes’ (elections, reconciliation), ‘basic services’ 
(health, education, sanitation), the restoration of ‘core government 
functions’ (particularly public finance), and ‘employment genera-
tion.’25 The report concluded that contributing to the restoration of 
these functions ‘requires augmenting capacity on the ground by de-
ploying additional international civilian capacity.’26  
 
A major theme of the ‘Early Recovery’ report was the need to engage 
in national capacity building as early as possible. Even so, huge exter-
nal inputs are required in the immediate term. As the report indicated, 
some of the already-on-the-ground humanitarian capacities that estab-
lish themselves during the fighting can be ‘redirected or transitioned 
towards early peacebuilding priorities, particularly through those enti-
ties that have a dual humanitarian and development mandate, such as 
UNCEF, FAO, WFP and WHO.’27 This still leaves a large gap. In ad-
dition to advancing proposals to improve the recruitment of mission 
leadership and the management structures through which they work, 
the report recommended that management teams be ‘supported by 
shared analytical, planning and coordination capacities in the form of 
small, unified teams of experts that can be rapidly supplemented by 
additional pre-identified expertise.’28 
 
The ‘standby capacities’ referred to consist mainly of ‘rosters of pre-
vetted candidates able and ready to deploy rapidly to serve as staff 
members of a United Nations mission or under engagement with other 
United Nations organizations, international financial institutions, 
NGOs or external partners.’ The report notes that this is easier said 
than done: ‘experience has shown that roster maintenance requires 
significant investment, particularly to ensure depth, range and diver-
sity of expertise, particularly from the South.’ In addition, ‘expert-
level rosters are rarely interoperable or coordinated and there is no 
single point for national and UN actors to transmit requests or obtain 
                                                 
25  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate  
Aftermath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881–S/2009/304 (11 June 2009), Para 16. 
26  Para? 
27  Ibid., Para 26. 
28  Ibid., Para 30. 
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information on what resources are available.’29 The report distils the 
problem to its essence by explaining that ‘[e]xperts continue to be de-
ployed piecemeal with different rules and procedures to support sepa-
rate parts of the United Nations in-country presence.’ This, combined 
with other factors, ‘complicates their ability to come together quickly 
and work together effectively.’30 
 
The report recognizes the management issues – particularly concern-
ing lines of authority extending from the SRSG to agency field staff 
and agency-funded consultants – that hinder the formation of effec-
tive, rapidly deployable civilian response teams. Part of the proposed 
solution is to develop ‘mutual accountability mechanisms’ to bind the 
various actors participating in the implementation of jointly agreed 
‘integrated strategic frameworks’ at the country level.31 In the absence 
of hard enforcement provisions, however, such mechanisms hold little 
potential to spur long-term improvement.  
 
In earlier drafts of the report – indeed as late as the draft of 18 May 
2009 (less than a month before the report’s release) – the PBSO was 
proposed as the entity best suited to leading the development of prin-
ciples and guidance on this topic. These analytical products would 
form the basis for training material. In the 18 May draft, the recom-
mendation was that ‘[t]he PBSO should work with roster leads to faci-
litate the development of common standards, training, and guiding 
principles to enhance the interoperability across expert rosters within 
each of the typical priority areas.’32 A remit to develop guidance is 
traditionally a weak form of mandate. Under the right circumstances, 
however, the formulation offered in the draft text could conceivably 
have provided a bureaucratic foothold (or at least toehold) en route to 
a potentially larger role in coordinating international civilian-response 
capacity. For instance, one element of this draft proposal was for the 
PBSO to play a role in developing ‘common standards.’ With suffi-
cient buy-in from other entities, the identification of standards can 
evolve into a system of specifying ‘minimum requirements’ for gov-
ernments, international bodies, NGOs, and others that contribute to 
civilian-response teams. Such a system can vest those who design and 
operate it with significant influence.  
 
In the final version of the Secretary’s General’s report, the PBSO was 
not tasked with performing this function. The revised text replaced 
‘the PBSO’ with ‘[t]he United Nations Secretariat.’ To decide to no-
minate the ‘Secretariat’ to perform this function is of course a non-
decision. Failing to specify which part of the Secretariat will take the 
                                                 
29 Ibid., Para 64. 
30 Ibid., Para 30. 
31 Ibid., Para 35. 
32 Ibid. 
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lead role on this matter is to encourage continued jockeying for posi-
tion among the departments and offices that consider themselves most 
capable of taking on the challenge. This is significant given the strong 
interest shown by some member-states in having UNDP’s Bureau of 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery serve as lead actor in this area. That 
such a seemingly small role was a point of such intense maneuvering 
is an indication of the extremely defensive posture adopted by organ-
izational units that have undergone continuous reform over at least the 
past dozen years. The creation of new departments, such as the De-
partment of Field Support (DFS), has accentuated this tendency of 
late. If nothing else, the final text of the Secretary-General’s ‘Early 
Recovery’ report made clear that it was within the Secretariat, not the 
agencies, that this function should reside.  
  
Because the Secretariat-based arrangements have yet to be finalized, 
the PBSO retains a chance to emerge as a significant actor in this 
field. A number of enabling conditions would, however, need to arise 
for the PBC and/or the PBSO, to play an important role in this area. 
The first would be a genuine interest on the part of the Secretary-
General to use the PBSO as a means of expanding his authority over 
mission planning. On an expansive reading of the Charter, the Secre-
tary-General is free to devolve further de facto authority on any Secre-
tariat unit he deems suitable. What deserves explicit recognition is 
that, to the degree that the PBSO can assume responsibility for manag-
ing a standby international civilian-response capacity – or is able to 
influence how such a system would work by developing standards, 
guidance, and training – it would be doing so as part of a centralizing 
tendency, an assertion by the Executive Office of the Secretary-
General (EOSG) of more regularized powers of decision-making. This 
is not about coordination, but about centralization. Excessive concen-
trations of power are not generally desirable, but as Roland Paris has 
argued, the costs of pursuing coordination are high as well.33 The key 
benefit of centralized authority is that it provides leverage to demand 
improved response from the governments and NGOs that supply re-
covery expertise. This can mean better availability of the highest-
priority expert categories – actual corrections officers, for instance, 
rather than retrofitted police constables – and that the standards ad-
hered to by contributing member states and other organizations are 
consistent with obligations found in UN policy.  
 
The second condition that would have to be met is more appropriate 
staffing patterns. For instance, the PBSO would need much greater 
country-specific expertise, including desk officers with more exten-
                                                 
33  Roland Paris, ‘Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding’, in 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
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sive first-hand experience of (and in) the countries with which they 
are to work.  
 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, as with the conflict-prevention 
role outlined in the previous section, the PBSO would need to make 
use of interagency structures and processes to increase its presence in 
planning for early recovery. In this case, however, there are several 
potential organizational entry points. Past efforts by the PBC to make 
use of them have been mixed, but this need not foreclose future op-
tions. One vehicle that could prove useful is the Cluster Working 
Group on Early Recovery (CWGER). This network has been growing 
both in size and in influence. It undertook work in more than 20 post-
conflict contexts in 2008, developed guidance on the identification of 
early recovery priorities, and participated in discussions on the Secre-
tary-General’s report. An empowered PBSO, which would require the 
strengthening of the PBC to provide political (intergovernmental) 
backing, could build on this framework rather than reinventing, for the 
sake of it, tools that already exist.  
 
Another existing structure that could help to facilitate the emergence 
of such a role is the Integration Steering Group (ISG), created in mid 
2008. It describes itself in its communications with field missions as 
‘mandated by the Secretary-General to oversee implementation and 
progress on integration-related matters,’ which gives it a very broad 
remit. The PBSO currently participates in this group, which is com-
posed of both Under Secretary-Generals (USGs) and Assistant Secre-
tary-Generals (ASGs), placing the ASG for Peacebuilding Support at a 
technical disadvantage in terms of rank, but one whose effects are in 
practice mitigated by the PBSO’s direct reporting line to the EOSG. 
During the process of drafting guidance for field missions on how to 
devise various strategic framework documents, the PBSO, despite its 
small size and its lack of operational authority, was an influential 
player. It helped that the PBSO also participates in several phases of 
the Integrated Mission Planning Process, including the Strategic As-
sessment phase, which determines the feasibility and desirability of 
establishing a mission. In an August 2009 group communication, the 
ISG presented this guidance document to Special (and Executive) Re-
presentatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs/ESRGs) as a binding 
statement of ‘minimum standards,’ with respect to both process and 
content, which would thenceforth have to be met when preparing 
country-level Integrated Strategic Frameworks.34 This hinted at the 
authority with which the ISG felt itself invested. 
 
 
                                                 
34  ‘Minimum Standards for Integrated Frameworks’, document transmitted via the Under-
secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, 11 August 2009.  
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V. Overseeing a Rules-Based Aid  
Relationship 
For each of the countries on its agenda, the PBC develops, ‘in partner-
ship with the national authorities,’ an ‘integrated peacebuilding strat-
egy’ (IPBS), as is called for in the PBA’s founding resolutions. The 
underlying rationale for initiating such a process was the need for in-
ternational assistance – whether focused on humanitarian, security, or 
recovery/development objectives – to be coordinated. Coordination in 
fact consists of three related but conceptually distinct elements. The 
first is agreement on a set of objectives that is logically coherent, in 
that the pursuit of one does not necessarily imply impairing the ability 
to achieve others. The second is the translation of these goals into ac-
tivities that, taken together, can reasonably be accomplished by the 
organizations concerned, including the government of the post-
conflict country under consideration. And, third, coordination implies 
agreement on a division of labour among the actors concerned.  
 
The IPBSs created under the PBC’s auspices have helped in the first 
category – increasing logical coherence – but have been less strong on 
the second and third categories, having had a negligible impact on 
what activities are undertaken and who performs them. The IPBSs 
completed thus far have been structured as ‘compacts’ – solemn  
undertakings between post-conflict governments and their internatio-
nal donors, concluded under the blessing of the PBC (which itself un-
dertakes to perform various functions, such as mobilizing additional 
funds), but with little real legal force behind them. Most notably, there 
is no mechanism for enforcing compliance. When promises are not 
fulfilled, there is scant recourse for any of the parties involved. Given 
the UN’s basis in a charter that enshrines state sovereignty as the 
source of all legitimacy, this is not surprising.  
 
The basic structure of these IPBSs – or what came to be called coun-
try-specific ‘peacebuilding frameworks’ – was crafted in the PBSO 
and elaborated upon through the PBC’s intergovernmental process. 
The IPBSs to date have not been terribly innovative, either in terms of 
their substance or their operative mechanisms. The initial test cases 
for the PBC – Burundi and Sierra Leone – both resisted anything but 
the most anodyne ‘priorities.’ This was understandable given the pro-
fusion of strategic plans in existence, including highly detailed Pov-
erty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) require for access to conces-
sional lending facilities.  
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The IPBSs for each of the countries on the PBC’s agenda consisted 
primarily of a selection of agenda items from preexisting national po-
verty-reduction and peace-consolidation plans. The monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms were badly designed – victims of political 
compromise rather than bureaucratic incompetence – and perform ac-
cordingly. In the case of Sierra Leone, little more than a year after the 
original Peacebuilding Framework – however flawed – was at last  
agreed between the PBC and the Government, it was superseded by a 
new all-encompassing peace consolidation plan announced by the Go-
vernment of Sierra Leone. The PBC naturally embraced this ‘nation-
ally owned’ effort as a step toward self-sustaining peace. To save face 
it had to. But it is difficult to interpret the disappearance of the fruits 
of 18 months of PBC labours – the IPBS for Sierra Leone – as a par-
ticularly promising development.  
 
A strong North-South cleavage characterized much of the PBC’s de-
liberations during the development of the IPBSs. Again, this came as 
no surprise given that the topic under consideration was, in effect, the 
nature of the aid relationship. Aid-recipient states among the PBC’s 
membership were, on the whole, eager to lend moral support to gov-
ernment officials representing the post-conflict countries on the PBC’s 
agenda, all of which were, by definition, highly aid-dependent. For 
instance, when a senior Burundian cabinet member, representing his 
country’s case before a country-specific meeting of the PBC, urged a 
‘lighter touch’ on the ‘review’ and ‘tracking’ processes contained 
within Burundi’s IPBS, he was warmly received among southern PBC 
members whose own experiences with intrusive aid donors had clearly 
made them sympathetic to pleas for a lot more autonomy and a bit 
more slack.  
 
The recipient-friendly PBC environment provides post-conflict coun-
tries on its agenda an incentive to ‘forum-shop.’ That is, when post-
conflict authorities are dissatisfied with the aid ‘settlement’ obtained 
through ordinary negotiating channels, the existence of the (partially 
PBC-controlled) PBF, an alternative finance window – one offering 
additional funds with less-onerous conditions – is highly prized. The 
PBC represents a new forum in which post-conflict governments can 
again plead for more aid, aid differently structured, aid with fewer 
strings attached, or aid for previously prohibited activities. The PBC’s 
attraction is that its membership is far more sympathetic than the usual 
line-up of Western donors found in country-level aid coordination 
mechanisms. Consultative Groups and other such donor forums leave 
national authorities isolated amidst a group of aid agencies, which are 
never fully like-minded, but nevertheless able to close ranks to impose 
certain constraints on which a core consensus exists.35 
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The PBC, with its large contingent of aid-receiving states, mostly 
drawn into the PBC via the GA and Economic and Social Council  
(ECOSOC) membership categories, is seen in many quarters as a 
place where restrictions imposed by in-country donor representatives 
can be revisited and potentially relaxed. In the early phases of the 
PBC’s engagement with Sierra Leone, for instance, it became clear 
that the Government wanted to use the PBF, the operating procedures 
of which were less clearly specified then than they are today, to fi-
nance initiatives that key donor representatives in Freetown, closing 
ranks, had refused to fund. These included plans for an elite civil ser-
vice fast-tracking programme and a poorly thought-through employ-
ment-generation scheme. Both were put on hold pending the outcome 
of Sierra Leone’s 2007 elections, as was the further elaboration of the 
country’s IPBS itself. In the end, the $35 million granted to Sierra 
Leone via the PBF did come with fewer strings attached than the aver-
age external financing mechanism. This was not to the liking of donor 
representatives in Freetown, who felt their efforts at tough love being 
undermined.  
 
Given all this, it is reasonable to be skeptical about the ability of the 
PBC to play a central (or even constructive) role in making aid rela-
tionships more rules-based. After all, earlier hopes for a similar role 
were not realized. For instance, when the PBC was coming into being, 
transnational civil society organizations, such as the Brussels-based 
International Crisis Group, had called for the PBC to act as a force for 
ensuring that human rights benchmarks were achieved.36 This proved 
to be short-lived rhetoric, uttered more out of hope than conviction, 
though subsequent statements showed intermittent support for the 
idea.37  
A more potent ground for skepticism is the degree of polarization in 
the PBC: the deep divisions cutting through the PBC’s membership 
arguably render it unfit as a forum for forging aid agreements (which 
is what, in part, integrated peacebuilding strategies are). In its current 
form, the PBC would indeed not serve the function of promoting a 
rules-based approach to aid relationships. But if tasked with adminis-
tering a transparent system for distributing assistance on the basis of 
clearly identifiable benchmarks, a transformation of the current insti-
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tutional climate is not impossible. Operating under a mandate that re-
quired regular review and assessment of country cases, PBC members 
might settle into the routinized activity of official deliberation, the 
regularity of which may provide incentives for members to moderate 
their views and cultivate relationships across the North-South divide.  
 
This paper does not spell out the details of the system over which the 
PBC could preside, but options include the sorts of enforceable mu-
tual-accountability mechanisms outlined in Barder and Birdsall’s 
much-discussed proposals for a ‘Payments for Progress’ approach to 
administering development assistance.38 The advantage of such a sys-
tem is that it binds donor governments to their funding commitments 
more closely than is typically the case in mutual-accountability sys-
tems, such as the various arrangements contained within the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) framework. An  
escrow account, containing pledged funds, remits payments directly to 
recipient-government treasuries on the basis of pre-specified perform-
ance criteria. One of the difficulties of creating such a mechanism is 
the lack of an adequate infrastructure for impartially operating it. In 
the context of post-conflict states, a strong case could be made that 
only the PBC possesses the breadth of membership to make such a 
system legitimate. 
 
Even during the PBC’s first three (sometimes shaky) years, there were 
indications that the North-South divide could occasionally be bridged, 
and that doing so could induce positive developments. Two examples 
can briefly be cited. Both, perhaps not coincidentally, were connected 
with cases where the PBC was able to provide something of a coun-
terweight, however slight and however temporary, to the preeminence 
of the World Bank and the IMF over economic policymaking in the 
context of one post-conflict country. The dominance of the Washing-
ton-based institutions – particularly regarding macroeconomic issues, 
but with a fairly strong presence in most policy sectors – is evident 
even in many post-conflict states where, in theory, an ‘integrated mis-
sion’ – representing the Secretary-General, the Security Council, and 
the UN Country Team of relief, development, and standards agencies 
– is the preeminent international institution. UN actors frequently re-
act to this situation by asserting the UN’s primacy in peacebuilding 
(or conflict-prevention/avoidance). The PBC sought to do precisely 
this in both instances.  
 
The first concerned relations between the IMF and Burundi. In 2007, 
the IMF was slow in disbursing the final tranche of funds from its  
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility agreement with Burundi. The 
                                                 
38  Owen Barder and Nancy Birdsall, Payments for Progress: A Hands-Off Approach to For-
eign Aid (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2006). 
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Fund was in fact not reviewing the government’s performance on va-
rious agreed ‘benchmarks,’ the achievement of which was a condition 
of continued financing. This was because the Fund was disappointed 
with the government’s tepid commitment, privately conveyed, to 
remedying clear problems, particularly with respect to public expendi-
ture management. A visit to Burundi by the chairperson of the PBC’s 
Burundi configuration took place around the same time. His report 
diagnosed the complex governance pathologies afflicting the country. 
After considering his report and debating the issue, the PBC came to a 
strong consensus that, no matter how problematic the government’s 
stewardship of the economy, or how egregious its failure to mend bro-
ken institutions, when a return to violent conflict was a clear and pre-
sent danger, threatening to withhold funds from a government that 
could barely pay its army was too risky a method for seeking to im-
prove policymaking and implementation. The PBC called for the IMF 
to release the funds, and for the Government of Burundi to exercise 
greater maturity in managing its public finances.39  
 
In effect, the PBC insisted that peacebuilding must trump economic 
orthodoxy.40 The legitimacy that the UN possesses on security issues 
meant that the PBC was taken more seriously than the UN usually is 
in such matters. It helped that several key donors governments were 
PBC members. Once it became clear that the PBC might take a strong 
position on the Burundi case, senior Bank and Fund officials began 
engaging with the PBC for the first time. Within days, the IMF issued 
a waiver related to Burundi’s non-fulfillment of its loan conditionali-
ties, and the remaining funds were released, avoiding a major crisis. 
One cannot know whether the PBC’s exertions had any concrete im-
pact. Either way, the consensus that emerged within the PBC – that 
economic rationality must at times be subordinated to the logic of 
peace – spanned the North-South divide. 
 
A second example concerned the priorities expressed in Sierra Leo-
ne’s peacebuilding strategy. Representatives of the Government of 
Sierra Leone argued that delays in the restoration and extension of 
electricity-generation and distribution constituted a barrier to building 
lasting peace. The World Bank opposed bringing the PBC into what 
had, to that point, been a policy domain in which the Bank exercised 
preponderant influence. The new conception of peacebuilding (ex-
tending into the ‘development’ phase) was contested by PBC mem-
bers who adopted a relatively time-restricted conception of peace-
building, with a focus on the early phases of ‘recovery,’ or roughly the 
first 18 months following a conflict’s conclusion. These members 
                                                 
39  See Rob Jenkins, ‘Organizational Change and Institutional Survival: The Case of the U.N. 
Peacebuilding Commission,’ Seton Hall Law Review, 38:4 (2008), pp. 1327-1364. 
40  Graciana del Castillo, Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Eco-
nomic Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
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considered power-generation a development issue that belonged 
somewhere other than the PBC. The division over the electricity issue 
was, somewhat surprisingly, not completely along North-south lines.   
In the end, the importance of the power sector to the execution of the 
peacebuilding consolidation plan was duly highlighted in the revised 
text. This opened up a broader range of ideas and approaches to deal-
ing with Sierra Leone’s power shortage than had been part of the dis-
cussion theretofore. Some PBC members took unusually nuanced 
stands: a developing country member that pushed for the inclusion of 
electricity generation as a key priority for peace consolidation in Si-
erra Leone also advocated a strong role for the private sector, a posi-
tion usually adopted by Western states perceived as instinctively pro-
business.41  
 
As ephemeral cases of partial influence on mainly minor matters, 
these examples are of limited general applicability. But they offer 
glimpses of the moderating influence that can emerge when intergov-
ernmental processes become routinized and open (relatively speaking) 
to external scrutiny. The dual legitimacy the PBC derives from its lo-
cation in the UN, which has a unique mandate with respect to peace 
and security, and its status as a broadly representative stakeholder-
based body, makes it a potentially useful instrument for deciding how 
assistance is to be allocated, in what form, to whom, in what quanti-
ties, with what frequency, for which purposes, on the basis of which 
benchmarks, and across what total length of time. It is of course diffi-
cult to persuade donors to dilute their control over national aid contri-
butions by placing them under the authority of a multilateral body. But 
it is not impossible.  
 
As with the other proposals for reimagining the PBA’s role, placing 
the PBC at the center of a rules-based system for distributing assist-
ance to post-conflict countries will require the PBSO, whose support 
to this new PBC function would be essential, to make use of existing 
coordination structures. Some of these may be located outside the UN. 
For instance, the PBC may want to draw on the analytical toolkits de-
vised by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, whose 
work in the area of ‘aid effectiveness’ has provided indicators to 
measure the extent to which donors fulfill their commitments under 
the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. The PBC 
and/or PBSO may, in turn, be well placed to inform the design of such 
indicators, tying them further to deliberative processes that engender 
moderation. Within the UN system, the Senior Peacebuilding Group 
may be able to serve as a vehicle for jointly developing the mecha-
nisms through which relevant information can be collected and con-
veyed to PBC members.  
                                                 
41  Author interview, New York, 26 January 2008. 
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VI. Facilitating Graduation from the 
Security Council Agenda 
As noted in Section II, above, the possibility that a new intergovern-
mental body might be of assistance in easing countries off of the Secu-
rity Council’s agenda was among the reasons why proposals to create 
the PBC received such broad support in the first place. Fearon and  
Laitin were merely the most explicit about this vision. It is widely 
recognized that the Security Council is ill-equipped to provide the re-
quisite level of ongoing attention to the large volume of cases it has 
been forced to carry in recent years. The Council was not designed to 
retain a close watching brief on countries where war has ended but the 
restoration of state authority, the revival of economic activity, and the 
return of community life may take a decade or more. Recent cases of 
conflict relapse – such as East Timor – have made the Security Coun-
cil skittish about scaling down its operations too hastily. But the desire 
to clear space on the Council’s agenda remains strong, as does the 
concern to ensure that ‘graduating’ countries receive continued atten-
tion from an institution of some political weight. The inclusion of the 
P5 within the PBC makes it at least potentially able to play this role.  
 
Ironically, the Secretary-General’s ‘Early Recovery’ report focused on 
the role the PBC could play in earlier phases of Council engagement 
with a conflict country rather than on the later stages, during which 
the Council’s involvement is brought to a conclusion. The report asks 
the Council to ‘consider more proactively how the advice of the  
[Peacebuilding] Commission could contribute to its work during the 
early phase of the Council’s consideration of post-conflict situations, 
for example, by providing an integrated peacebuilding perspective and 
specific suggestions for the Council’s own engagement with the coun-
try on its agenda.’42  
 
The proposal advanced in this paper, however, concerns the later pha-
ses, without prejudice to the question of whether earlier PBC engage-
ment would help as well. As the report put it, ‘the respective roles of 
the Council and the Commission need to be seen as complementary 
and in parallel, as envisaged by the founding resolutions, rather than 
sequenced in a manner that would diminish the Commission’s role 
during earlier phases where it could add significant value.’ Two ana-
lytical errors can be found here. The first is to conflate ‘complemen-
tarity’ with operating ‘in parallel.’ The second is to assume that it is 
not possible to operate both in parallel and sequentially, when in fact 
                                                 
42  United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Af-
termath of Conflict, UN Doc. A/63/881–S/2009/304 (11 June 2009), Para 82. 
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what is being proposed here is precisely that: the PBC would work 
alongside the Council, but would then become the recipient of a  
‘handover’ – a form of sequentiality – when specified benchmarks 
have been met.  
 
The PBSO has already been deeply engaged in the process of identify-
ing performance measures that accurately capture progress toward 
self-sustaining peace consolidation. It has done this through its en-
gagement with a number of interagency structures, including the 
Working Group on Transitions, which brings together a vast array of 
UN entities under the aegis of a collaboration between two umbrella 
groupings, the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs 
(ECHA) and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). PBSO 
staff members, supported by PBC (and non-PBC) member-states with 
an interest in this question, also interacted with the UN’s interagency 
Framework Team, whose work was discussed briefly in Section III 
with respect to the development of a comprehensive conflict-
prevention role.  
 
There has never been a fixed procedure for ‘graduation’ off the Secu-
rity Council’s agenda. Indeed, the issue has been clouded by confu-
sion over the distinction between graduation in the sense of no longer 
remaining an agenda item, and ‘exit’ in the sense of winding down the 
security components of multidimensional peace operations. While 
there is no reason why the PBC should not take on countries far in ad-
vance of any such exit or graduation moment, and follow the situation 
concurrently with the Council, advising as necessary, the PBC should 
also be prepared to inherit cases that have become stable enough for 
the Council to, in effect, let go, at which point the peacebuilding or 
integrated mission/office would instead begin reporting to the PBC on 
a regular basis.  
 
What constitutes ‘stable enough’ is in part a question of the methodo-
logies employed to design metrics. It is also a political matter that, in 
the end, the Council will have wide latitude in deciding. The essential 
point is that there are incentives for the Council to decompress its 
work programme; a measurement and analysis tool validated by an 
impartial UN office provides cover for taking the necessary decisions 
on cases that constitute a lower priority. In proposing such a system, it 
would of course be reiterated, though it should be apparent already, 
that nothing (besides a P5 veto) would prevent the Council from again 
becoming seized of any conflict situation it had handed off to the 
PBC.  
 
The PBC has already taken actions that, de facto, position it poten-
tially to assume a role of this type. The most significant has been the 
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evolving practice of chairpersons of PBC country-specific configura-
tions participating – as invitees – in Council meetings devoted to the 
countries concerned. This is consistent with the expert-input function 
implied in the language of the PBA’s founding resolutions, which de-
signate the PBC as an advisory body, without specifically limiting the 
scope of its advice.  
 
A report issued by DPKO’s Best Practices Unit concluded that ‘it is 
the prerogative of the Security Council to decide whether a United 
Nations peacekeeping operation should hand-over responsibility to 
another United Nations body or non-United Nations entity, and with-
draw.’43 The report maintained, however, that ‘the Secretariat and the 
United Nations peacekeeping operation have a responsibility to ensure 
that the Security Council's decision is based on an honest assessment 
of real progress made towards the achievement of a sustainable pea-
ce.’44 PBC Country-Specific Meeting (CSM) chairpersons who have 
engaged in recent field visits have been particularly welcomed by  
Security Council members, who appreciate an alternative point of 
view from that provided by the SRSG/ESRG and by the Secretary-
General’s regular country-situation reports. That the CSM chairper-
sons are also member-states can, depending on their personal qualities 
and which countries they represent, carry a certain amount of weight 
with Council members – in most cases, more so than a presentation by 
a Secretariat official.  
 
It would be through a mechanism of this type, suitably modified, that 
the linkage could be made between the Council and the PBC for the 
purpose of determining whether a conflict situation continued to merit 
a place on the Council’s agenda, or whether it could expeditiously and 
safely be passed into the care of the PBC, which would inherit some 
limited subset of the powers conferred on the Council, not least the 
right to request and deliberate upon progress reports, make recom-
mendations to the SG on restructuring elements of the remaining UN 
country-level presence to correct deficiencies identified through the 
review process, and call on resources available to fill peacebuilding 
gaps. As with the other proposals in this paper, designing the precise 
mechanics of a graduation system would require a substantial consul-
tation effort and likely would encounter huge resistance from several 
quarters.  
 
For planning ‘[t]he transition from a United Nations peacekeeping op-
eration to subsequent phases of United Nations engagement,’ accord-
ing to the DPKO report alluded to earlier, ‘benchmarks and indicators 
                                                 
43  United Nations Secretariat, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Sec-
tion, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York, 18 
January 2008), Para 174. 
44  Ibid. 
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are required to determine when the United Nations peacekeeping  
operation can begin the process of hand-over and withdrawal, without 
jeopardizing ongoing efforts to consolidate the peace.’45 The ‘hand-
over’ may not be only to national authorities, but to a multilateral 
body, of substantial legitimacy and political weight, that can exercise 
oversight for an extended period of time. The PBC may best fit this 
description.  
 
 
 
VII. Conclusions and Prospects 
The PBA has done well to survive its traumatic birth and infancy, 
even if the quality of its performance has not been what some had ex-
pected and others hoped. The organizational components that make up 
the PBA – the PBC, the PBSO, and the PBF – possess their own char-
acteristics and face unique incentive structures. Each has demon-
strated a capacity to seek out and exploit new opportunities within the 
loose structure provided by a fragmented UN system. It is on the basis 
of this impressive degree of adaptability that the scenarios outlined in 
this paper have been predicated. There is nothing inherent in the 
PBA’s institutional design that impels it toward playing the sorts of 
roles indicated.  
 
On the other hand, there are reasons why, say, five years from now 
moving in some of these new directions may seem more feasible than 
it does today. First, there is sustained pressure from various constitu-
encies to continue exploring ways of increasing the perceived fairness 
of the system of global governance, both within and beyond the UN. 
This includes perennial agenda items such as Security Council reform, 
for which there remains nothing remotely approaching consensus. To 
the extent that reinforcing the powers and functions of the PBA can be 
sold as a further down-payment on future Council reform, revising the 
PBA’s mandate becomes an attractive means of buying time.  
 
The second reason why a more propitious environment for redefining 
the PBA’s mandate may materialize over the coming years is im-
proved relations between senior officials of the UN and the IFIs. 
There has for some years been evidence that field staff and manage-
ment have developed a more constructive modus operandi.46 A spirit 
of active partnership is increasingly evident at leadership/HQ levels as 
well. This has been manifested most visibly in the process of refining 
                                                 
45  Ibid., Para 177. 
46  Madeline O’Donnell, 2005, UN Peacekeeping and the World Bank: Perceptions of Senior 
Managers in the Field, DPKO External Study November 2005. 
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joint post-conflict needs assessment instruments. This has extended 
beyond UNDP to include a large number of other concerned UN enti-
ties (including the PBSO). In addition, agreements have been signed at 
senior management levels to ensure the interoperability of UN- and 
IFI-managed multi-donor trust funds. If reasonable cooperative insti-
tutional relations can be maintained, then the idea of the PBC and the 
PBSO playing some of the roles outlined in this paper may be less off-
putting to Bank and Fund officials than might otherwise be the case.  
 
Finally, we must consider one factor that has been largely implicit in 
the analysis thus far: the sequencing of, and ‘interaction effects’ 
among, the four roles proposed in this paper. It may be that the 
changes that primarily involve the PBSO, such as establishing and 
managing an international civilian-response standby capacity, attract 
less political opposition and are therefore easier to implement. The 
proposed institutional roles that involve the PBC, on the other hand, 
tend to impinge more directly and obviously on other powerful actors 
– such as donor governments (in the case of managing a rules-based 
aid relationship) or the P5 (in the case of bringing the PBC into the 
process of clearing cases off the Council’s agenda). These differences 
may call for a tailored approach to sequencing.  
 
Another consideration that may need to be borne in mind when deter-
mining the order in which such changes might be introduced is the 
question of how the performance of one role can affect the ability to 
be considered for, or effectively undertake, another. So, for instance, 
were the PBC and the PBSO to begin playing a more active role in 
conflict-prevention in countries that have not yet ‘emerged from con-
flict,’ they may build up the contacts, resources, and goodwill neces-
sary to take on some of the other challenges outlined in this paper, 
such as managing international civilian-response capacity. Similarly, 
experience gained in devising the operation of a rules-based aid-
disbursement system may prove useful in winning access to the kinds 
of forums necessary to participate in identifying the benchmarks and 
indicators to be used when assessing a country’s readiness to graduate 
off the Security Council’s agenda.  
 
Even with these enabling factors, reinventing the PBC will be an up-
hill struggle. The need for consensus in order to authorize institutional 
reform is a powerful ally of the status quo. A five to ten-year time-
frame may, in retrospect, seem woefully insufficient and short-
sighted. This is all the more reason why interim measures are neces-
sary. The prospects for the longer-term (five to ten year) vision for the 
PBA to materialize will hinge largely on decisions taken in the near 
term, particularly on questions related to organizational design and 
institutional practice. It is worth briefly discussing some of the inter-
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mediate objectives that could constitute process milestones en route to 
the functional profile envisaged in the preceding pages.  
 
The advantage of the four functions identified in this essay is that they 
can be incrementally achieved, or at least demonstrated, rather than 
remaining merely aspired to. Each can be realized in parts. All four 
functions are amenable to indirect/unofficial approaches, allowing 
‘sheer presence’ and routine to begin exerting a legitimizing influence 
on the performance of these roles. The interagency structures identi-
fied earlier in the paper – the organizational sinews that help to hold 
the UN together – will also be crucial. 
 
With respect to the comprehensive prevention function, there may be 
fewer near-term obstacles than is commonly assumed. Both DPA and 
DPKO have shown themselves more amenable in recent years to 
deeper and more sustained partnerships with other UN entities press-
ing for a more ‘inclusive’ approach to conflict prevention and resolu-
tion. Both DPA and DPKO have worked with the United Nations De-
velopment Fund for Women (UNIFEM), for instance, to address the 
many issues that stem from conflict-related sexual violence – a phe-
nomenon that cuts across prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. Through DPA’s Mediation Support Unit and DPKO’s 
Best Practices Unit, as well as by means of other less-obvious entry 
points, the PBC and PBSO may be able to begin a discussion about 
the merits of building a better UN-wide predictive capacity, which 
could serve as the basis for future collaboration between all three enti-
ties.  
 
As for enhancing the international community’s ability to plan for and 
rapidly deploy the civilian components of multidimensional peace  
operations – whether during peacekeeping or peacebuilding – there is 
evidence that the PBC and PBSO are making headway. The PBSO is 
playing a lead role in an interagency analytical exercise designed to 
map international civilian-response capacity. Depending on how it is 
handled, this role could be a useful springboard to a more permanent 
position in the management of an integrated system of functionally 
specific rosters. The current patchwork system offers no single  
mechanism for consolidating, let alone fulfilling, requests for assis-
tance.  
 
The milestones on the way to the PBC assuming anything like the 
third function – overseeing the conduct of rules-based aid relation-
ships – are even more difficult to discern. There is, first off, a large 
element of chance involved, depending on which countries happen to 
fill the various PBC quotas in upcoming stakeholder-election cycles. 
If progressive donors take control, an initiative to set truly mutual 
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benchmarks might get off the ground. But this is not necessarily 
likely. Similarly, the role the PBC can play will depend on what tran-
spires in other aid-management forums beyond the UN. The key point 
is that the PBC has the potential, if Northern and Southern countries 
learn to moderate by transcending their interests/identities, to become 
a site in which trade-offs between security and economic objectives 
can be assessed and appropriate decisions taken in countries on the 
PBC’s agenda. The PBC will need to prove itself first, however, 
which makes the selection of future post-conflict cases for the PBC’s 
agenda of the utmost importance.  
 
Finally, there is the question of ‘graduation.’ There are indications of 
increased interest in this question among PBC members. Unfortu-
nately, the initial wave of enthusiasm has come with respect to possi-
ble ways of determining whether a given post-conflict country is ready 
to graduate off the PBC’s agenda, when logically speaking, decom-
pressing the Security Council’s agenda should be the first order of 
business. All countries currently on the PBC’s agenda are also on the 
Council’s agenda. The PBC, one can only assume, will not be taking 
any country off of its agenda that the Council considers a matter wor-
thy of its continued scrutiny. Once a country comes off the Council’s 
agenda, there would indeed be a need to determine how long there-
after the PBC ought to keep the country under review. But in the 
meantime, the PBC would stand a better chance of enhancing its or-
ganizational profile if it were to seize the opportunity to shape the 
Council’s procedure for deciding when countries no longer constitute 
a fit ‘matter’ for it to be ‘seized of.’ This can be done without chang-
ing the PBC’s mandate if its membership is willing to take the initia-
tive. In fact, as a general rule, actions which require no formal au-
thorization – to expand a mandate or increase direct funding – are 
likely to remain the primary means by which the PBA’s component 
institutions go about pursuing new roles for themselves. A more fun-
damental form of re-engineering will take considerably longer and 
require a commensurably deeper well of good fortune.  
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